We characterise the interplay between¯rms' decision in product development undertaken through a research joing venture (RJV), and the nature of their ensuing market behaviour.
Introduction
Both the current antitrust legislation and the literature appear to adopt a schizophrenic attitude towards cooperation amongst¯rms in R&D activities on one side, and collusion in marketing on the other. Whilst public authorities explicitly prohibit collusive market behaviour, there is scarce evidence that they discourage cooperation in R&D activities.
As to the latter, there indeed exist several examples of policy measures meant to stimulate the formation of research joint ventures (RJVs henceforth).
1 Analogous considerations in favour of RJVs have been put forward by several authors (Grossman and Shapiro, 1986 ; Brodley, 1990 ; Jorde and Teece, 1990 ; Shapiro and Willig, 1990 ; and, for a general appraisal, Tao and Wu, 1997) . If cooperation in innovation activities may induce collusion in the product market, then the above mentioned tendency to encourage cooperative R&D but to discourage market collusion will render itself inconsistent.
In this paper, we model an RJV as a noncooperative two-stage game played by participant¯rms. The¯rst stage (t = 0) concerns product development. The second (t = 1; 2; ¢ ¢ ¢) is a supergame concerning market competition, either in quantities or in prices, with time discounting with a constant factor ± . In particular, unlike most of the existing literature on market supergames with heterogeneous products, we explicitly take into account the e®ort-saving e®ects of the RJV in our model. Namely, even though each rm develops its own product, multiple¯rms can develop some, if not all, of the components of their products jointly in attempt to save innovative e®orts. It is inevitable that such an attempt makes their products partly similar, thereby increasingly substitutable.
The two polar cases are a full RJV in which the participant¯rms develop all components of their product jointly, and a null RJV where each¯rm develops the whole of its product independently. General cases are somewhere in between these two extremes, each¯rm developing some parts of its product independently. 2 A full RJV minimises the initial innovative e®ort exerted by each participant¯rm, while it results in an entirely identical product across¯rms, making their ensuing market competition the most strenuous. As the RJV becomes less and less \joint", involving each¯rm's partially independent in-1 See the National Cooperative Research Act in the US ; EC Commission (1990) ; and, for Japan, Goto and Wakasugi (1988) . 2 Partially joint product development can also be achieved without an explicit \venture" agreememt negotiated between¯rms. For example, almost all the leading PC (personal computer) manufacturers (e.g., IBM, Compaq, Hewlett Packard) buy one main component, the pentium processer, from Intel
Corporation. These PC manufacturers do not invest seperately to produce such processors for their machine. Yet one¯rm di®erentiates its product from rival products by investing e®ort to develop other features that makes its product distinct from rival¯rms.
novative e®orts, the initial cost of product development increases on one hand, and the severity of the ensuing market competition decreases on the other because¯rms are now selling mutually distinct products.
Our game is fully noncooperative in that each¯rm independently decides the degree of its involvement in the RJV in the¯rst stage. 3 This choice variable having been exercised by every¯rm, both the amount of each¯rm's initial innovative e®ort cost and the degree of substitutability between¯rms' products are automatically determined. Namely, in this paper we abstract the joint process of multiple¯rms' product development into one strategic variable which is each¯rm's involvement in the RJV, and two exogenous functions of the pro¯le of the strategic variable across¯rms : one determines the cost of product development, which decreases in each¯rm's involvement, and the other determines the degree of substitutability between¯rms' products perceived on the demand side, which obviously increases in each¯rm's involvement in the RJV. The second stage, the market supergame, is also fully noncooperative in that we consider only subgame perfect equilibrium paths, whether the resulting prices and/or quantities are collusive or generated by the one-shot Nash equilibrium.
Hereby intuitively, each¯rm would decrease its involvement in the RJV as ± increases.
Each¯rm's initial e®ort exerted in product development can be viewed as an investment in attempt to ease the competition in the ensuing marketing stage. However, there is a counterforce, which is the fact that the degree of product substitutability a®ects the required level of ± in order for subgame perfection of collusive price and/or quantity paths in the market supergame.
1. When ± is very low,¯rms have no hope in sustaining implicit collusion in the marketing supergame. Therefore, each¯rm's involvement in the RJV decreases in ± .
2. When ± is intermediate,¯rms have a strong incentive to keep up the degree of product substitutability at that level which is su±cient in order to sustain a collusive subgame perfect equilibrium in the ensuing market supergame. Since the threshold in ± decreases in product substitutability, the higher ± is, the more substitutable thē rms' products are allowed to be, which allows each¯rm to increase its involvement in the RJV.
3. When ± is high enough for¯rms to sustain collusion in the marketing supergame irrespective of their product substitutability, each¯rm's involvement in the RJV again decreases in ± .
Hence we establish that each¯rm's initial decision in product development is non-monotone in ± .
The paper is organised as follows. The basic model is laid out in section 2. Firms' interaction is closely analysed in section 3 in an equilibrium comparative statics framework, focusing on symmetric pure-strategy subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes. Then, welfare implications are discussed in section 4. Section 5 concludes the paper, summarising our main qualitative¯ndings and locating it in the context of the existing literature.
The setup
We consider the following two-stage game, played by two a priori identical¯rms. Each rm sells only one product. The¯rst stage (t = 0) is for product innovation, where the degree of substitutability between the two¯rms' products is endogenously determined as a result of the R&D decisions exercised noncooperatively by the two¯rms. The second stage is a supergame in marketing (t = 1; 2; ¢ ¢ ¢), either in prices or in quantities. Throughout the game, the discount factor ± is common to both¯rms.
Second stage (super)game : Marketing with optimal punishment
In the second stage (t = 1; 2; ¢ ¢ ¢), each¯rm faces the following inverse demand function:
in which°2 (0; 1] measures the degree of substitutability between the two¯rms' products (see Dixit, 1979; Singh and Vives, 1984) . By inverting (1), the direct demand function obtains :
Marginal production cost is constant and thus normalised to zero.
Let ¼ M denote cartel pro¯t, and ¼ N K one-shot Nash equilibrium pro¯t per¯rm per period, under the type of competition K. For future reference, it is useful to derive explicitly here the threshold levels of the discount factor ± ¤ K (°) under both quantity and price competition. Straightforward calculations are needed to derive the per period per rm noncooperative pro¯ts (see Singh and Vives, 1984) :
Obviously, the cartel pro¯t is the same in both settings, i.e., half the monopoly pro¯t:
In establishing the critical threshold of the discount factor stabilising collusion under either price or quantity competition, we apply Abreu's (1986 Abreu's ( , 1988 rule. Finding the optimal punishment quantity q p or price p p , as well as the critical threshold of the discount factor
, involves solving the following system of simultaneous equations in the case of Bertrand behaviour:
where
is the pro¯t resulting from the one-shot best response when the other¯rm plays p , and ¼ B (p p ) denotes the pro¯t during the symmetric punishment period. The solution to (4)- (5) is :
The functional forms of both p p and ± ¤ B (°) shift at°= p 3 ¡ 1 , due to a non-negativity constraint on the quantity being supplied by the cheated¯rm during the deviation period (see Deneckere, 1983 ; and Ross, 1992) . Then, they shift again at°= (3 p 5 ¡ 5)=2 , due to the fact that a deviation in the punishment phase would never take place at a negative price. When°= 1,¯rms are providing homogeneous products, so that ¼
. Note that, at°= 1 , the punishment price p p is still strictly negative (see Lambson, 1987) .
Under Cournot competition, solving the system (in which the notation is analogous to the previous Bertrand case)
yields the optimal punishment quantity as well as the critical level of the discount factor for all°2 (0; 1] :
First stage game : RJV in product development
Unlike previous contributions, we consider the choice of°as a costly commitment. A full RJV, where the two¯rms jointly develop one product, economises R&D costs, while leading to homogeneous products (°= 1) marketed in the future. The more independent R&D e®orts each¯rm exerts, the more distinct their resulting products will be. Therefore, when¯rms invent their new products at t = 0 , they face a tradeo® between the cost of innovative investment and the increase in the stream of operative pro¯ts they may obtain from the ensuing market supergame.
We abstract the negotiation process undertaken by the two¯rms in deciding the extent of jointness of the product innovation, e.g. which components of the two¯rms' products should be developed jointly and which else independently, into one strategic variable exercised noncooperatively by each¯rm. This variable, denoted by º i (i = 1; 2)
hereinafter, can be conceptualised as the degree of¯rm i's intended involvement in the RJV between the two¯rms. Once º 1 and º 2 have been submitted by the two¯rms mutually independently and noncooperatively, the negotiation between these two¯rms entails uniquely to the cost of product innovation per¯rm 
where obviously (7) corresponds to the case of a null RJV, and (8) corresponds to the case of a full RJV.
Note that these conditions on ©[¢; ¢] and°[¢; ¢] ensure the existence of a symmetric pure strategy equilbrium º 1 = º 2 . Even though there does not necessarily exist a one-to-one relation between°and © , there is indeed a strictly monotone one-to-one relation between them given º 1 = º 2 . We denote this monotone relation by°(©) hereinafter, which is a strictly decreasing function.
Comparative statics results
At the development stage (t = 0),¯rms choose their intention to be involved in the RJV, º 1 and º 2 , simultaneously and mutually independently through non-cooperative decisions.
The game trees are as illustrated in¯gures 1 and 2, in which the market supergame is suppressed into a binary description of collusive and competitive outcomes. Discounted pro¯ts are computed based upon (2) and (3) in the previous section. Firm 1 ³ ³ ³ ³ ³ ³ 1 P P P P P P q
P P P P P P P P P P q
Cournot-Nash if Firm 1 ³ ³ ³ ³ ³ ³ 1
Bertrand-Nash if Bertrand supergame (t = 1; 2; ¢ ¢ ¢)
Discounted pro¯ts per¯rm
In any symmetric pure-strategy equilibrium, each¯rm incurs the cost ©[º 1 ; º 2 ] in the R&D stage (t = 0). In the marketing stage (t = 1; 2; ¢ ¢ ¢), each¯rm's pro¯ts per period
(see equations (2) and (3) in section 2) decrease monotonically in°[º 1 ; º 2 ] . Hence, by assumption (6), the equilibrium º i decreases monotonically, although it may or may not be continuous, in ± . This observationally implies the following. In the left diagram, the relationship between © and ± is described. The whole space is divided by the downward sloping locus ± = ± ¤ K (°(©)) . To the north-east of this locus, collusion is sustainable in the marketing stage. Within this region, the candidate equilibrium level of innovative e®orts © increases monotonically, either continuously or discontinuously, in ± . The diagram depicts the case where the graph TU of © smoothly increases in ± . On the other hand, to the south-west of the critical locus ± = ± ¤ K (°(©)) , rms repeat one-shot Nash equilibria in the marketing stage.
5 Within this region (note that this region does not include the critical boundary), the candidate equilibrium level of initial investment © increases monotonically in ± . Once again, the diagram represents the graph of © with a smooth curve VW although © need not always be continuous in ± .
It is qualitatively clear that W should be situated to the north-west of T, and therefore that the kinked locus WTU is an unambiguous part of the optimal © in response to ± .
To the west of W,¯rms face the choice whether to sustain collusion by paying high initial e®orts. The break-even point, denoted by ± X where each¯rm's discounted pro¯t at X equals that at Y, must lie between W and ± ¤ K (°) .
Hereby the optimal locus VX-YTU is established. Overall, the venture investment increases as¯rms become more forward looking, which is the reason why both loci TU and VW are up-sloping. However, in an intermediate range of ± , where venture decisions can a®ect future cartel stability,¯rms choose the minimum level of © ensuring collusion sustainability, unless the initial investment is excessively costly (to the upper-left of Y) compared to discounted future gains.
5 Our qualitative diagrams would stay similar even if we took into account partial collusion, in which case the following scenario would arise. Firms collude at the monopoly level whenever possible, which preserves our diagram intact to the north-east of the locus ± = ± ¤ K (°(©)) . To the south-west of the locus where they are unable to sustain monopoly-level collusion, they choose partial collusion, i.e., the most pro¯table collusion sustainable given ± and°. Note that this makes marginal gains from º i jump discontinuously between these two regions. Hence, as long as°and © are smooth in º i , the graphs of candidate equilibrium°and © will always jump at the boundary
This analysis is translated in terms of the equilibrium degree of product substitutability°i n the right diagram. The degree of substitutability generally decreases in ± , except in a small region to the right of ± = ± X , where the equilibrium°rapidly increases in ± (the interval [± X ; ± T ) in the diagrams). This is due to the fact that it is only in this region that the sustainability of future collusion, be that in prices or in quantities, becomes the binding factor in determining the degree of substitutability.
Figure 3 : Venture costs and substitutability as a function of ± .
Hence,¯rms' endogenous choice of º 1 , º 2 , and therefore the resulting amount of R&D investment © and the degree of product substitutability°, are both non-monotone and discontinuous in their time discount factor ± .
Proposition 1 : There exist ± X and ± T , where
²¯rms' R&D investment increases and the endogenous degree of product substitutability decreases in ± 2 [0; ± X ) as well as in ± 2 (± T ; 1) , and vice versa in ± 2 (± X ; ± T ) ;
² both © and°(©) have a discontinuous jump at ± X , and a kink at ± T .
Policy and welfare implications
In essence, the only component of social welfare which is neglected by¯rms is consumer surplus, computed as (per period t = 1; 2; ¢ ¢ ¢) :
in Bertrand-Nash, all of which decrease in°(©) and thus increase in © . Therefore ceteris paribus, consumer surplus tends to be higher as the degree of product substitutability decreases.
An overview
When Hence, the following welfare characterisation can be given.
Proposition 2 : Total surplus can be improved by a downshift in ©[¢; ¢] when ± 2 [0; ± X ) and when ± 2 (± T ; 1) .
Refer to section 3 and Proposition 1 about the de¯nition of ± X and ± T .
Proposition 2 recommends that R&D investment be encouraged through public policy.
This is indeed consistent with those commonly implemented policy measures to stimulate product development, such as investment tax credits. Consequently, enhanced innovative e®orts exerted by each¯rm reduces the degree of product substitutability. In this sense, the more R&D is encouraged, the less \joint" it becomes. This seems to contradict with the widely observed tendency that public authorities often favour RJVs.
A natural curiosity here is : is there any situation where the jointness of the RJV should be encouraged by policy measures ?
A closer insight
As shown in Proposition 1, the locus of the equilibrium © has a discontinuous jump at ± = ± X . This indicates the possibility that an incremental change in R&D subsidisation or taxation could bring a substantial impact on¯rms' venture decisions and on the resulting social welfare when ± is in the neighbourhood of ± X . Even though Proposition 2 is operative over greater portions of the parametric space ± 2 [0; 1) , any marginal policy alteration entails only a marginal perturbation in product development wherever the loci of equilibrium © ,°are continuous.
By de¯nition, when ± = ± X ,¯rms are indi®erent between points X and Y in¯gure 3.
Let © X and © Y denote the levels of investment per¯rm at X and Y, respectively, where
Namely, in the Cournot game,
In the Bertrand game,
The implications of inequality (9), equations (10) and (11) One is to induce a positive shift in ± X . This is made possible by a policy that either subsidises path VW or taxes on path YW in¯gure 3. Since the latter incurs higher R&D expenditures than the former, the policy is to make the costs of partial independence in the RJV more progressive and thereby to encourage the jointness of the RJV.
The other alternative is to induce a reduction in¯rms' discount factor ± . This can be attained either by a macroeconomic contraction policy that raises the interest rate, or by an industrial regulation tightening corporate¯nance.
² Y welfare-dominates X if the social bene¯t of reducing product substitutability outweighs that of market competition. In this case it enhances welfare to encourage outcomes in the neighbourhood of Y relative to those in the vicinity of X.
To this end, it is e®ective to induce a decrement in ± X . This is attained by a policy that either penalises path VW or rewards path YW. Such a policy is to make the Katz and Ordover, 1990 ; Kamien et al., 1992 ; Suzumura, 1992 ; inter alia). Besides, there exists a wide literature concerning the e®ects of product di®erentiation on the stability of implicit collusion either in output levels or in prices (Deneckere, 1983 ; Chang, 1991 Chang, , 1992 Rothschild, 1992 ; Ross, 1992 ; Friedman and Thisse, 1993 ; HÄ ackner, 1994 HÄ ackner, , 1995 HÄ ackner, , 1996 Lambertini, 1997 ; inter alia) . So far, however, few serious attempts have been made to interconnect these two streams of research, except for Martin (1995) and Cabral (1996) .
The former takes into account an RJV aimed at achieving a process innovation for an existing product which is marketed by¯rms through Cournot behaviour. Cabral proves the existence of cases where competitive pricing is needed to sustain more e±cient R&D agreements. On the other hand, Martin's analysis shows that cartel stability is enhanced by the presence of cooperation in process innovation, so that the welfare advantage of the RJV by eliminating e®ort duplication can be jeopardised by the arising of collusion in the ensuing market phase. Our e®ort in this paper serves to clarify potential implications of Martin's work to the case of product innovation, in lieu of process innovation.
The particular bene¯t from discussing product innovation is that we can interlink the strategic aspects of R&D with the e®ect of inter-¯rm product portfolios in the ensuing marketing stage. In this paper we have mapped the e®ects of both intertemporal preferences and the technology of product development on¯rms' venture decisions as well as on their market behaviour over the entire parameter space. Contrary to some of the earlier beliefs, we have established that the relationship between product substitutability and the discount factor can indeed be both non-monotone and discontinuous. This seemingly counterintuitive result stems from the balance between cost considerations in product development and¯rms' concern towards future cartel stability.
Note also that product innovation, unlike process innovation, has a direct e®ect on consumers' surplus by a®ecting the product portfolio in the market. In fact, our nonmonotonicity and discontinuity results carry over to welfare implications. Namely, as long as¯rms' collusive inclination in their market behaviour stays una®ected, it marginally enhances welfare to encourage independent product development beyond¯rms' private incentives. On the contrary, if the status quo happens to be near the parity between¯rms' collusive and non-collusive incentives, then an incremental alteration in R&D policy | either to encourage or to discourage the jointness of the RJV | can entail a discontinuously massive impact on welfare.
